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and	 practices	 to	 address	 grave	 problems	 resulting	 from	 harmful	
speech	 on	 their	 platforms	 —	 notably,	 the	 vast	 amounts	 of	
misinformation	associated	with	the	COVID-19	pandemic	and	with	the	
2020	 presidential	 election	 and	 its	 aftermath.	 By	 and	 large	 —	
consistent	with	 First	 Amendment	 values	 of	 combatting	 bad	 speech	
with	 good	 speech	 —	 the	 platforms	 sought	 to	 respond	 to	 harmful	
online	speech	by	resorting	to	different	types	of	flagging,	fact-checking,	







approaches	 are	 consistent	 with	 First	 Amendment	 values.	 In	
particular,	 I	 examine	 what	 the	 major	 social	 media	 platforms	 have	
done	and	are	doing	to	facilitate,	develop,	and	enhance	counterspeech	
mechanisms	on	their	platforms	in	the	context	of	major	elections,	how	
closely	 these	 efforts	 align	 with	 First	 Amendment	 values,	 and	
measures	 that	 the	 platforms	 are	 taking,	 and	 should	 be	 taking,	 to	
combat	 the	 problems	 posed	 by	 filter	 bubbles	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
microtargeting	of	political	advertisements.		
This	Article	begins	with	 an	overview	of	 the	marketplace	of	 ideas	
theory	of	First	Amendment	jurisprudence	and	the	crucial	role	played	
by	 counterspeech	within	 that	 theory.	 I	 then	 analyze	 the	 variety	 of	
types	of	counterspeech	on	social	media	platforms	—	by	users	and	by	
the	 platforms	 themselves	—	with	 a	 special	 focus	 on	 the	 platforms’	
counterspeech	 policies	 on	 elections,	 political	 speech,	 and	
misinformation	in	political/campaign	speech	specifically.	I	examine	in	
particular	on	 the	platforms’	prioritization	of	 labeling,	 fact-checking,	
and	 referring	 users	 to	 authoritative	 sources	 over	 the	 use	 of	
censorship,	removal,	and	deplatforming	(which	the	platforms	tend	to	
reserve	for	the	most	harmful	speech	in	the	political	sphere	and	which	












been	 acknowledged	 as	 the	 preeminent	 model	 on	 which	 our	 First	
Amendment	 free	 speech	 protections	 are	 based.	 Although	 courts	
sometimes	 credit	 other	 justifications	 for	 protecting	 speech	 —	
including	 the	 role	 of	 free	 speech	 in	 our	 system	 of	 democratic	 self-
government1	and	in	advancing	individuals’	interest	in	self-expression	
and	self-fulfillment2	—	 the	courts’	preeminent	and	most	 frequently	
invoked	 justification	 or	 model	 for	 freedom	 of	 expression	 is	 the	
marketplace	of	ideas.	The	very	notion	of	ideas	vying	and	competing	in	
the	 market	 presupposes	 an	 interplay	 and	 exchange	 of	 ideas	 and	
therefore	presupposes	that	“counterspeech”	will	be	made	available	in	
response	 to	 speech	 and	 that	 the	 citizenry	will	 be	 able	 to	 hear	 and	
receive	 competing	 viewpoints	 and	 perspectives.	 Accordingly,	
pursuant	 to	 this	 predominant	 model,	 the	 default	 response	 to	 bad	
speech	is	not	censorship	but	more	(better)	speech.	As	Justice	Brandeis	
explained	 in	his	oft-quoted	concurrence	 in	Whitney	v.	California:	 “If	
there	be	time	to	expose	through	discussion	the	falsehood	and	fallacies	
[of	speech],	to	avert	the	evil	by	the	process	of	education,	the	remedy	
to	 be	 applied	 is	 more	 speech,	 not	 enforced	 silence.”3	 Under	 the	
marketplace	theory	of	the	First	Amendment,	the	default	remedy	for	
harmful	 ideas	 in	 the	 marketplace	 of	 speech	 is	 not	 censorship,	 but	
counterspeech,	which	recognizes	the	importance	of	access	to	diverse,	
antagonistic,	competing	viewpoints	and	the	free	trade	in	ideas,	which	
functions	 by	 allowing	 those	 who	 are	 exposed	 to	 bad	 speech	 to	 be	





creating	 an	 informed	 electorate,	 but	 also	 “rests	 .	.	.	 on	 the	 deeper	moral	 premises	














Notably,	 while	 the	 marketplace	 of	 ideas	 theory	 (and	 its	 default	
response	of	counterspeech	as	a	remedy	for	bad	speech)	accords	broad	
protection	to	good	and	bad	ideas,	this	theory	does	not	accord	the	same	




as	 a	 false	 idea	—	 that	 all	 ideas	 are	 protected	 —	 but	 it	 has	 also	
explained	 that	 false	 statements	of	 fact	 are	not	 similarly	protected.6	
While	 the	 Court	 has	 sometimes	 recognized	 the	 minimal	 potential	
contributions	to	the	marketplace	of	ideas	made	by	harmless	lies7	and	

































counterspeech	 as	 an	 integral	 element	 of	 our	 First	 Amendment	
marketplace	of	ideas	model	in	a	number	of	cases	throughout	the	past	
century,	even	as	the	mediums	for	expression	have	shifted	from	print	
to	broadcast	 to	cable	 to	 the	 Internet.	 In	addition,	and	relatedly,	 the	
Court	has	recognized	the	importance	of	citizens	being	exposed	to	and	
confronting	 a	 diverse	 array	 of	 opinions	 —	 including	 speech	 with	
which	they	disagree.	Although	the	enablement	and	prevalence	of	filter	
bubbles	on	 the	 Internet	 is	 a	 recent	development,	 First	Amendment	
jurisprudence	 has	 long	 been	 centered	 around	 the	 importance	 of	
citizens’	exposure	to	diverse,	antagonistic,	and	competing	viewpoints.		
In	its	decisions	constitutionalizing	the	common	law	of	defamation,	
for	 example,	 the	 Court	 has	 recognized	 our	 “profound	 national	
commitment	to	the	principle	that	debate	on	public	issues	should	be	
uninhibited,	robust,	and	wide	open”10	and	accordingly	that	the	default	
response	 to	 speech	 critical	 of	 public	 figures	 is	 not	 liability	 or	
retraction/removal,	 but	 is	 instead	 more	 speech.	 As	 the	 Court	
explained	in	Gertz	v.	Welch,	“the	first	remedy	available	[to	targets	of	
defamation]	is	self-help	–	using	available	opportunities	to	contradict	
the	 lie	 or	 correct	 the	 error.”11	 This	 remedy	 is	 especially	 suited	 to	
public	officials	and	public	figures,	who	generally	“enjoy	significantly	
greater	access	to	the	channels	of	effective	communication	and	hence	
have	 .	.	.	 a	 realistic	 opportunity	 to	 counteract	 false	 statements	 [and	
engage	in	counterspeech].”12		
The	Court	has	further	recognized	the	importance	of	counterspeech	












“Fairness	 Doctrine,”	 a	 set	 of	 regulations	 that	 required	 broadcast	
television	and	 radio	 stations	 to	provide	 fair	 coverage	 to	 competing	
sides	 of	 the	 discussion	 of	 public	 issues	 and	 to	 provide	 for	 a	
“reasonable	 opportunity	 to	 respond”	 if	 “an	 attack	 is	 made	 on	 the	
honesty,	 character,	 integrity,	 or	 like	 personal	 goals	 of	 an	 identified	
person	or	group.”13	In	upholding	the	constitutionality	of	the	Fairness	
Doctrine’s	 obligations	 placed	 upon	 broadcasters,	 the	 Court	
emphasized	 the	 First	 Amendment	 goal	 of	 “producing	 an	 informed	
public	 capable	 of	 conducting	 its	 own	 affairs”	 and	 refused	 to	 allow	
forums	in	broadcast	television	or	radio	to	be	turned	into	information	
silos	 monopolized	 by	 one	 side	 of	 the	 debate	 or	 the	 other	 on	




Similarly,	 in	 Turner	 Broadcasting	 System	 v.	 FCC,16	 the	 Court	
recognized	 the	 importance	of	 ensuring	 that	 citizens	are	exposed	 to	
competing	 and	 diverse	 viewpoints.	 Turner	 involved	 a	 challenge	
brought	 by	 several	 cable	 systems	 operators	 to	 the	 “must	 carry”	
provisions	 of	 the	 Cable	 Television	 Consumer	 Protection	 and	
Competition	 Act	 of	 1992	 (the	 Cable	 Act).17	 The	 Act	 required	 cable	
systems	 operators	 to	 carry	 the	 signals	 of	 local	 educational	 public	
broadcast	television	stations,	without	charge,	in	the	same	numerical	
channel	position	 as	when	 these	programs	were	broadcast	 over	 the	
air.18	The	Court	credited	several	important	government	interests	that	


















remand,	 Justice	Breyer	 credited	 the	Act’s	purpose	of	 advancing	 the	
national	 communications	 policy	 of	 protecting	 “the	 widest	 possible	
dissemination	of	information	from	diverse	and	antagonistic	sources”	
and	explained	that:	
[This	 national	 communications]	 policy,	 in	 turn,	 seeks	 to	
facilitate	 the	 public	 discussion	 and	 informed	 deliberation,	
which,	 as	 Justice	 Brandeis	 pointed	 out	 many	 years	 ago,	
democratic	 government	 presupposes	 and	 the	 First	
Amendment	 seeks	 to	 achieve.	.	.	.	 Indeed,	 Turner	 [below]	
rested	 in	 part	 upon	 the	 proposition	 that	 “assuring	 that	 the	
public	has	access	to	a	multiplicity	of	information	sources	is	a	
governmental	purpose	of	 the	highest	order,	 for	 it	promotes	
values	central	to	the	First	Amendment.”21	
In	its	public	forum	jurisprudence	as	well,	the	Court	has	emphasized	
the	 importance	 of	 citizens’	 exposure	 to	 competing	 viewpoints,	




It	 is	 no	 accident	 that	 public	 streets	 and	 sidewalks	 have	
developed	 as	 venues	 for	 the	 exchange	of	 ideas.	 Even	 today,	
they	 remain	 one	 of	 the	 few	 places	where	 a	 speaker	 can	 be	
confident	 that	he	 is	not	 simply	preaching	 to	 the	choir.	With	
respect	 to	 other	 means	 of	 communication,	 an	 individual	
confronted	with	an	uncomfortable	message	can	always	turn	
the	page,	change	the	channel,	or	leave	the	Web	site.	Not	so	on	
public	 streets	 and	 sidewalks.	 There,	 a	 listener	 often	
encounters	speech	he	might	otherwise	tune	out.	In	light	of	the	
First	 Amendment’s	 purpose	 “to	 preserve	 an	 uninhibited	













analyzed	 the	 marketplace	 of	 ideas	 and	 specifically	 in	 the	 Internet	
context,	 it	 has	 further	 recognized	 the	 importance	of	 counterspeech	
and	exposure	to	diverse	viewpoints	to	our	information	ecosystem.	In	
Packingham	 v.	 North	 Carolina,	 for	 example,	 Justice	 Kennedy	
emphasized	the	 important	role	served	by	social	media	platforms	 in	
today’s	marketplace	of	 ideas,	 explaining	 that	 they	 serve	as	modern	






utilize	 Twitter	 as	 a	 forum	 in	 which	 to	 engage	 their	 constituents.24	
Kennedy	 further	 noted	 that	 social	 media	 sites	 offer	 “relatively	
unlimited,	 low-cost	capacity	for	communication	of	all	kinds,”	where	
users	 can	 “engage	 in	 a	 wide	 array	 of	 protected	 First	 Amendment	
activity	on	topics	‘as	diverse	as	human	thought.’”25	He	observed	that	
the	Internet	in	general	and	social	media	in	particular	are	“integral	to	



































Wray	 for	 the	 position	 of	 FBI	 director,29	 as	well	 as	 to	 remove	 then-
Secretary	of	State	Rex	Tillerson,30	then-Secretary	of	Veterans	Affairs	
David	Shulkin,31	 then-Secretary	of	Defense	Mark	Esper,32	 and	 then-
Director	 of	 the	 Cybersecurity	 and	 Infrastructure	 Security	 Agency	
(“CISA”)	 Chris	 Krebs33	 from	 their	 respective	 positions,	 and	 to	
	
	 29	 Donald	 J.	 Trump	 (@realDonaldTrump),	 TWITTER	 (June	 7,	 2017,	 4:44	 AM),	
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/872419018799550464	
[https://perma.cc/	
JWH6-9EZR]	 (“I	 will	 be	 nominating	 Christopher	 A.	 Wray,	 a	 man	 of	 impeccable	
credentials,	to	be	the	new	Director	of	the	FBI.	Details	to	follow.”).		









Admiral	 Ronny	 L.	 Jackson,	 MD,	 as	 the	 new	 Secretary	 of	 Veterans	 Affairs	 .	.	.”	
immediately	followed	by	“.	.	.	In	the	interim,	Hon.	Robert	Wilkie	of	DOD	will	serve	as	
Acting	 Secretary.	 I	 am	 thankful	 to	Dr.	 Shulkin’s	 service	 to	 our	 country	 and	 to	 our	
GREAT	VETERANS!”).	













sought	 to	 allow	 only	 favorable	 followers	 and	 favorable	 Twitter	
commentary	on	such	announcements	and	decisions	—	and	to	block	
the	counterspeech	of	those	who	disagreed	with	him	and	his	policies.	
In	 defending	 such	 actions	 against	 constitutional	 attack,	 he	 claimed	
that	 his	 Twitter	 account	 was	 private,	 not	 governmental,	 or	 in	 the	
alternative,	that	the	interactive	comment	spaces	associated	with	his	
tweets	 constituted	 “government	 speech”	 immune	 from	 scrutiny	
under	the	Free	Speech	Clause	of	the	First	Amendment	—	instead	of	a	
public	 forum	 in	 which	 the	 citizenry	 was	 permitted	 to	 counter	 his	




a	 public	 forum	 because	 it	 was	 a	 forum	 “in	which	 other	 users	may	
directly	 interact	 with	 the	 content	 of	 the	 tweets	 by	 .	.	.	 replying	 to,	
retweeting	 or	 liking	 the	 tweet.”35	In	 holding	 that	 the	 President,	 by	
speaking	 on	 Twitter,	 created	 a	 public	 forum	 consisting	 of	 this	
interactive	 space,	 the	 court	 concluded	 that	Trump’s	 act	 of	 blocking	
users	 from	 speaking	 in	 this	 space	 amounted	 to	 unconstitutional	
viewpoint	 discrimination	 within	 a	 public	 forum.36	 Referencing	 the	
	
is/1gN5x]	(“.	.	.	votes	from	Trump	to	Biden,	late	voting,	and	many	more.	Therefore,	
effective	 immediately,	 Chris	 Krebs	 has	 been	 terminated	 as	 Director	 of	 the	
Cybersecurity	and	Infrastructure	Security	Agency.”).	
	 34	 Donald	 J.	 Trump	 (@realDonaldTrump),	 TWITTER	 (July	 26,	 2017,	 5:55	 AM),	
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864	
[https://perma.cc/	
















important	 role	 played	 by	 social	 media	 companies	 like	 Twitter	 in	
facilitating	 counterspeech	 in	 the	 online	 marketplace	 of	 ideas,	 the	
court	observed:		
[W]e	write	 at	 a	 time	 in	 the	 history	 of	 this	 nation	when	 the	
conduct	of	our	government	and	its	officials	is	subject	to	wide-
open,	 robust	 debate.	 This	 debate	 encompasses	 an	
extraordinarily	 broad	 range	 of	 ideas	 and	 viewpoints	 and	
generates	a	 level	of	passion	and	 intensity	 the	 likes	of	which	
have	rarely	been	seen.	This	debate,	as	uncomfortable	and	as	
unpleasant	 as	 it	 frequently	 may	 be,	 is	 nonetheless	 a	 good	
thing.	In	resolving	this	appeal,	we	remind	the	litigants	and	the	














reason.”	 .	.	.	 Today’s	 digital	 platforms	 provide	 avenues	 for	 historically	
unprecedented	amounts	of	speech,	including	speech	by	government	actors.	
Also	 unprecedented,	 however,	 is	 the	 concentrated	 control	 of	 so	 much	
speech	in	the	hands	of	a	few	private	parties.	.	.	 .	The	Second	Circuit	feared	
that	then-President	Trump	cut	off	speech	by	using	the	features	that	Twitter	
made	 available	 to	 him.	 But	 if	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 speech	 is	 not	
smothered,	then	the	more	glaring	concern	must	perforce	be	the	dominant	
digital	 platforms	 themselves.	 As	 Twitter	made	 clear,	 the	 right	 to	 cut	 off	
speech	lies	most	powerfully	in	the	hands	of	private	digital	platforms.	The	
extent	to	which	that	power	matters	for	purposes	of	the	First	Amendment	










continued	 to	 recognize	 the	 preeminent	 importance	 of	 the	
marketplace	of	 ideas,	of	broad	exposure	 to	diverse,	 competing,	and	





In	 today’s	 information	 ecosystem,	 the	 social	 media	 platforms	
facilitate	 speech	 and	 counterspeech	 on	 the	 Internet	 on	 an	
unprecedented	 scale.	 The	 platforms	 do	 this,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 by	
serving	as	 forums	where	 individuals	can	speak	and	respond	 to	one	
another’s	speech.	This	occurs	notably	on	social	media	platforms	like	
Twitter	 and	 Facebook,	 where	 users	 can	 respond	 to	 one	 another’s	
speech	and	where	the	default	remedy	for	bad	speech,	by	and	 large,	
continues	 to	 be	 counterspeech	 not	 censorship.	 Although	 these	
platforms	 host	 a	 vast	 array	 of	 speech	—	 including	 a	 vast	 array	 of	
harmful	speech	—	by	and	 large	 the	platforms’	primary	response	 to	
harmful	 speech	 has	 not	 been	 censorship/removal	 but	 rather	
counterspeech	of	one	form	or	another.	While	the	major	platforms	do	
censor	some	limited	categories	of	harmful	speech	—	and	have	done	
so	 to	 a	much	 greater	 extent	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 January	 6,	 2021,	
insurrection	 at	 the	 Capitol	—	 they	 have	 generally	 adhered	 to	 First	
Amendment	 values	 of	 allowing	 harmful	 speech,	 absent	 such	 a	
likelihood	 of	 imminent	 harm	 or	 emergency,	 and	 facilitating	
counterspeech	as	the	default	response	to	harmful	speech.	Because	the	
major	social	media	platforms	wield	enormous	power	over	speech	in	
today’s	 information	 ecosystem,	 those	 who	 control	 such	 platforms	
have	 expressed	 reticence	 to	 exercise	 the	powers	 of	 the	 censor	 and	
have	 sought	 to	manifest	 their	 commitment	 to	 the	 free	 speech	 and	
counterspeech	ideals	on	which	the	First	Amendment	is	premised.	For	








the	 arbiter	 of	 truth	 in	 the	 online	 information	 ecosystem,	 deferring	
instead	 to	 its	 role	 of	 facilitating	 the	 marketplace	 of	 ideas	 and	
counterspeech	 as	 a	 remedy	 for	 bad	 speech	 on	 its	 platform.40	 And	
Facebook,	for	its	part,	has	publicly	railed	against	the	idea	that	it	should	
be	the	arbiter	of	truth	on	matters	of	public	importance,	explaining:	“in	





violence	 or	 harm,	 constitutes	 an	 actual	 threat	 of	 violence,43	 or	
















AP	 NEWS	 (Oct.	 24,	 2019),	
https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2	
[https://perma.cc/4GZQ-K37D].	
	 42	 See	Nick	Clegg,	Facebook,	 Elections	 and	 Political	 Speech,	 FACEBOOK	NEWSROOM	
(Sept.	 24,	 2019),	 https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-
speech/	 [https://perma.cc/Z9VZ-Q6FU]	 [hereinafter	 Facebook,	 Elections	 and	
Political	 Speech].	 Facebook	 will,	 however,	 subject	 the	 posts	 of	 political	 action	
committees	and	political	advocacy	groups	to	its	fact-checking	process.	Facebook	has	









likewise	 unprotected	 in	 First	 Amendment	 jurisprudence.44	 In	




too	 is	 consistent	 with	 First	 Amendment	 jurisprudence	 and	 the	
marketplace	 of	 ideas	model,	 which	 broadly	 extends	 protections	 to	
good	and	bad	ideas,	but	less	so	to	good	and	bad	assertions	of	fact,	as	
discussed	 above.	 Yet	 overwhelmingly,	 the	 platforms’	 predominant	
and	 preferred	 response	 to	 the	 vast	 array	 of	 “bad”	 speech	 on	 their	
platforms	had	been	through	the	mechanism	of	counterspeech.	This	is	
particularly	 true	 regarding	 the	 online	 speech	 by	 public	 officials,	
including	 President	 Trump,	 which	 the	 platforms	 had	 been	 quite	




public	 officials.	 Along	 these	 lines,	 Twitter	 had	 created	 and	




in	 knowing	 and	 being	 able	 to	 discuss	 [elected	 and	 government	
officials’]	 actions	 and	 statements.”46	 The	 platforms’	 former	 policies	
	
	 44	 In	 contrast	 to	 First	 Amendment	 jurisprudence,	 however,	 the	 major	 social	
media	platforms	generally	have	 taken	a	much	 stricter	position	on	 restricting	hate	
speech	than	under	First	Amendment	law.		
	 45	 About	 Public-Interest	 Exceptions	 on	 Twitter,	 TWITTER,	
https://help.twitter.com/en/	
rules-and-policies/public-interest	 (last	 visited	 Jan.	 25,	 2021)	
[https://perma.cc/KG7Y-QBW4].	
	 46	 Id.	 For	 example,	 even	 though	President	Trump’s	 infamous	 tweet	 “When	 the	
looting	 starts,	 the	 shooting	 starts”	 violated	 Twitter’s	 policy	 prohibiting	 the	
glorification	of	violence,	the	tweet	was	hidden	behind	a	notice	claiming	it	breached	
Twitter’s	 policies	 on	 glorifying	 violence.	 The	 tweet	 could	 still	 be	 viewed	 and	
retweeted	 with	 the	 comment,	 but	 could	 not	 be	 liked,	 replied	 to,	 or	 retweeted	
otherwise.	See	Ryan	Browne,	Twitter	Flags	Trump	Tweet	on	Minneapolis	for	‘Glorifying	














people	 can	 respond	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 to	 one	 another’s	 speech.	
Twitter	 and	 Facebook,	 for	 example,	 create	 vast	 opportunities	 for	
counterspeech	in	the	forms	of	people	interacting	with	one	another’s	
speech	by	following	or	friending	one	another	and	interacting	with	one	
another’s	 speech	 in	a	wide	variety	of	ways,	 such	as	 commenting	 in	
response,	retweeting,	liking/disliking,	etc.	While	private	figure	users	
can	 control	 who	 they	 follow	 and	 who	 follows	 them	 by	 blocking,	
muting,	unfriending	and	the	like	(which	in	turn	can	lead	to	problems	
for	 the	 counterspeech	mechanism	 caused	by	 “filter	 bubbles”),	 such	
control	does	not	apply	to	public	officials,	whose	use	of	social	media	
platforms	like	Facebook	or	Twitter	has	been	held	by	courts	to	create	




Second,	 the	 platforms	 engage	 in	 and	 facilitate	 counterspeech	
themselves,	including	by	(1)	labeling	speech	(with	labels	determined	
by	 the	platforms	 themselves	and/or	by	working	with	external	 fact-
	
	 47	 See,	e.g.,	Knight	First	Amend.	Inst.	at	Columbia	Univ.	v.	Trump,	928	F.3d	226	(2d	
Cir.	 2019)	 (holding	 that	 President	 Trump’s	 use	 of	 the	 interactive	 features	 of	 his	
@realDonaldTrump	 Twitter	 account	 for	 government	 purposes	 created	 a	 limited	




limited	 public	 forum	 by	 using	 her	 Facebook	 page	 for	 government	 purposes	 and	
violated	 the	 First	 Amendment	 by	 engaging	 in	 unconstitutional	 viewpoint	
discrimination	when	she	blocked	a	constituent	from	posting	on	her	page	because	his	








directing	 users	 to	 authoritative	 third-party	 information/external	
trusted	sources	in	response	to	speech;	(3)	referring	speech	to	external	
fact-checkers	 for	 evaluation	 and	 subsequent	 labeling;	 and	 (4)	
referring	 speech	 to	 external	 fact-checkers/external	 trusted	 sources	
for	 evaluation	 and	 commissioning	 the	 production	 of	 responsive	
counterspeech	 (such	 as	 Facebook’s	 “related	 articles,”	 discussed	
below).	 Such	 counterspeech	 interventions	 by	 the	 platforms	 have	
developed	 extensively	 in	 the	 past	 two	 years	 and	 expanded	
dramatically	 in	 the	 months	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 2020	 presidential	
election.	Below	I	analyze	in	detail	these	interventions	in	the	context	of	





In	 the	 time	period	 leading	up	 to	 and	 immediately	 after	 the	2020	
presidential	 election,	 the	 major	 platforms	 undertook	 extensive	
measures	to	check,	counter,	and,	in	some	extreme	circumstances,	to	
remove	election-related	misinformation	and	disinformation.	First,	the	
platforms	 adopted	 policies	 regarding	 misinformation	 that	 they	
applied	 to	political	 and	 campaign	 related	 speech,	 including	policies	
applicable	to	manipulated	media	such	as	deepfakes	and	shallow	fakes.	
In	 addition,	 the	 platforms	 enacted	 extensive	 policies	 regarding	
misinformation	about	the	logistics	of	the	voting	process	and	the	post-
Election	 Day	 announcement	 of	 results.	 The	 platforms	 generally	
wielded	their	power	consistent	with	the	approach	described	above,	
by	 censoring/removing	 only	 the	most	 egregious	 and	 harmful	 false	
posts,	while	engaging	in	various	forms	of	counterspeech	with	respect	
to	 posts	 deemed	 less	 harmful	 and	 with	 respect	 to	 posts	 by	
government	officials	on	matters	of	public	importance.	The	platforms	
adopted	 this	 approach	 until	 the	 unprecedented	 actions	 of	 former	
President	Trump	and	his	surrogates	in	the	wake	of	the	2020	election	
and	 the	 events	 surrounding	 the	 January	 2021	 insurrection,	 as	 I	







former	 President	 Trump	 and	 his	 surrogates	 and	 in	 response	 to	
Trump’s	posts	inciting	the	insurrection	at	the	Capitol.	
A.	 Twitter	
With	 respect	 to	 manipulated	 media	 like	 deepfakes	 and	 shallow	
fakes,48	 Twitter	 generally	 takes	 the	 approach	 of	 prioritizing	
counterspeech	 or	 labeling	 instead	 of	 censorship	 or	 removal.	 In	
February	 2020,	 Twitter	 adopted	 a	 policy	 on	 “synthetic	 and	
manipulated	media”	 that	provides:	 “You	may	not	deceptively	 share	
synthetic	or	manipulated	media	that	are	likely	to	cause	harm”49	and	
explained:	 “we	 may	 label	 Tweets	 containing	 synthetic	 and	
manipulated	media	to	help	people	understand	their	authenticity	and	
to	 provide	 additional	 context.”50	 Pursuant	 to	 this	 policy,	 and	
consistent	 with	 First	 Amendment	 values	 generally,	 Twitter	 labels	
content	that	is	deceptively	altered	or	fabricated	and	removes	content	
	
	 48	 See	 Yoel	 Roth	&	Ashita	 Achuthan,	Building	 Rules	 in	 Public:	 Our	 Approach	 to	
Synthetic	 &	 Manipulated	 Media,	 TWITTER	 BLOG	 (Feb.	 4,	 2020),	
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/new-approach-to-
synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html	[https://perma.cc/HN8B-DKVA].	A	deepfake	
is	 a	 digitally	 altered	 “image	 or	 recording	 that	 has	 been	 convincingly	 altered	 and	
manipulated	 to	misrepresent	 someone	as	doing	or	 saying	 something	 that	was	not	
actually	done	or	 said.”	Mark	Verstraete,	 Inseparable	Uses,	 99	N.C.	L.	Rev.	456,	459	
n.144	 (2021);	 see	 also	 J.	 THOMAS	MCCARTHY	 &	 ROGER	 E.	 SCHECHTER,	 THE	 RIGHTS	 OF	
PUBLICITY	 AND	 PRIVACY	 §	 6.85	 (April	 2021);	 Matthew	 Bodi,	 The	 First	 Amendment	
Implications	of	Regulating	Political	Deepfakes,	47	Rutgers	Comput.	&	Tech.	L.J.	143,	
144	(2021);	Danielle	K.	Citron	&	Robert	Chesney,	Deep	Fakes:	A	Looming	Challenge	for	
Privacy,	 Democracy,	 and	 National	 Security,	 107	CALIF.	 L.	 REV.	1753,	 1759	 (2019)	
(noting	 that	 emergence	 of	 generative	 technology	 “will	 enable	 the	 production	 of	














has	 already	 shown,	 on	 five	 separate	 occasions,	 that	 it	 will	 place	
warnings	 on	 posts	 from	 President	 Trump	 that	 violate	 its	 policies,	
including	its	manipulated	media	policy.52	
In	the	first	case	of	Twitter	applying	this	new	policy,	Twitter	labeled	
as	 “manipulated	media”	an	edited	video	 featuring	 then	presidential	
candidate	 Joe	 Biden	 in	 which	 Biden	 appeared	 to	 be	 endorsing	
President	Trump	for	re-election	in	2020,	which	was	tweeted	by	White	








	 52	 Twitter’s	 first	 warning	 labels	 on	 Tweets	 from	 the	 President	 involved	
unsubstantiated	 claims	 about	 mail-in	 ballots	 being	 fraudulent,	 glorifying	
violence/use	 of	 force,	 and	 a	 manipulated	 video	 (discussed	 further	 below).	 See	
Elizabeth	Dwoskin,	Twitter’s	Decision	to	Label	Trump’s	Tweets	Was	Two	Years	in	the	
Making,	 WASH.	 POST	 (May	 29,	 2020,	 4:55	 PM	 PDT),	
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/	
29/inside-twitter-trump-label/	 [https://perma.cc/N2ST-DE2Z].	 Prior	 to	 his	





































primarily	 in	 the	 form	 of	 labeling	 and	 reference	 to	 authoritative	
information	by	trusted	sources,	to	tweets	that	it	deemed	less	harmful	
that	 implicated	 election	 integrity.	 Pursuant	 to	 this	 policy,	 Twitter	
committed	to	remove/censor	attempts	to	manipulate	or	disrupt	civic	
processes,	“including	through	the	distribution	of	false	or	misleading	
information	 about	 the	 procedures	 or	 circumstances	 around	
participation	 in	 a	 civic	 process,”55	 while	 responding	 with	
counterspeech	to	what	it	deems	to	be	less	harmful	interferences	in	the	
election	 processes.	 Referencing	 this	 policy,	 Twitter	 explains:	 “In	





In	 addition,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 announcement	 of	 post-election	












• misleading	 claims	 that	 cause	 confusion	 about	 the	 established	 laws,	






• misleading	claims	about	police	or	 law	enforcement	activity	 related	 to	
voting	in	an	election,	polling	places,	or	collecting	census	information;	










claim	 an	 election	 win	 before	 it	 is	 authoritatively	 called.	 To	
determine	 the	 results	 of	 an	 election	 in	 the	 US,	 we	 require	
either	 an	 announcement	 from	 state	 election	 officials,	 or	 a	
public	 projection	 from	 at	 least	 two	 authoritative,	 national	
news	 outlets	 that	 make	 independent	 election	 calls.	 Tweets	
which	 include	 premature	 claims	 will	 be	 labeled	 and	 direct	
people	to	our	official	US	election	page.56	
Twitter	reserved	for	itself	the	discretion	to	determine	whether	to	
remove/censor	 or	 engage	 in	 counterspeech	 regarding	 misleading	
information	about	election	outcomes,	including	the	discretion	to	take	







significant	 attention	 or	 has	 caused	 substantial	 public	 confusion);	
and/or	(5)	restrict	users’	ability	to	reply,	retweet,	or	like	tweets.	
In	accordance	with	 its	Civic	 Integrity	Policy,	Twitter	 reserved	 for	
itself	the	right	to	take	measures	—	either	removal	or	counterspeech,	
depending	 on	 severity	 and	 source	 —	 in	 response	 to	 misleading	
information	about	election	outcomes	that	was	intended	to	undermine	
public	 confidence	 in	 the	 elections,	 including	 “disputed	 claims	 that	
could	 undermine	 faith	 in	 the	 process	 itself,	 such	 as	 unverified	
information	about	election	rigging,	ballot	tampering,	vote	tallying,	or	
certification	 of	 election	 results”	 and	 “misleading	 claims	 about	 the	
results	or	outcome	of	a	civic	process	which	calls	for	or	could	lead	to	
interference	with	the	 implementation	of	the	results	of	the	process,”	
for	 example,	 “claiming	 victory	 before	 election	 results	 have	 been	
	
	 56	 Vijaya	Gadde	&	Kayvon	Beykpour,	Additional	Steps	We’re	Taking	Ahead	of	the	







certified,	 inciting	 unlawful	 conduct	 to	 prevent	 the	 procedural	 or	
practical	implementation	of	election	results.”57		
Twitter	 first	 exercised	 its	 discretion	 under	 the	 above	 policies	 to	
label	 misleading	 information	 by	 President	 Trump	 about	 mail-in	
voting.	On	October	26,	2020,	President	Trump	issued	a	tweet	claiming	
that	there	were	“big	problems	and	discrepancies	with	Mail	In	Ballots	
all	 over	 the	 USA.”	 Twitter	 responded	 by	 engaging	 in	 the	 following	
types	of	counterspeech:	(1)	labeling	the	tweet	as	containing	disputed	
content	or	as	being	potentially	misleading,	(2)	creating	a	fact-check	







rather	 than	 to	 Retweet,	 to	 encourage	 users	 to	 add	 their	 own	





















Anticipating	 a	 disputed	 election,	 on	 November	 2,	 Twitter	




• All	 accounts	 with	US	 2020	 candidate	 labels	(including	 US	
2020	Presidential	candidate	and	campaign	accounts)	
	
	 59	 Cf.	 Twitter	 Safety,	 Expanding	 Our	 Policies	 to	 Further	 Protect	 the	 Civic	
Conversation,	 TWITTER	 (Sept.	 10,	 2020),	
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/civic-integrity-policy-
















• State	 election	 officials	 (as	 determined	 by	 the	 National	
Association	of	Secretaries	of	State	and	the	National	Association	
of	State	Election	Directors)	












300,000	 tweets	 related	 to	 the	 presidential	 election	 as	 disputed.	








	 62	 Kate	 Conger,	Twitter	 Says	 It	 Labeled	 0.2%	 Of	 All	 Election-Related	 Tweets	 As	











to	 slow	 down	 the	 rapidly	 proliferating	 misinformation	 about	 the	
result	 of	 the	 election,	 election	 fraud	 and	 related	 conspiracies,	 and	
“stop	 the	 steal”	 movement	 by	 carrying	 out	 previously	 announced	
election-integrity	 polices	 as	 well	 as	 by	 adding	 additional	
counterspeech	and	“friction”	to	the	process	of	engaging	with	posts	—	
and	ultimately	by	removing	the	worst	violations	and	violators	from	its	
platform.	 In	 the	 immediate	 post-election	 period,	 Twitter	 initially	
attempted	 to	 contain	 Trump’s	 false	 election	 claims	 and	 the	
burgeoning	 “stop	 the	 steal”	 movement	 by	 flagging	 misinformation	
and	restricting	engagement;	adding	friction	to	sharing	posts	to	try	to	
slow	the	spread	of	misinformation;	flagging	Trump’s	false	claims	and	




banning	him	permanently	 a	day	 later;	 suspending	 related	 accounts	
that	 continued	 to	 spread	 election	 conspiracies,	 and	purging	QAnon	
affiliated	accounts.	I	explore	each	of	these	measures	in	greater	detail	
below.	
First,	 in	 the	 immediate	 wake	 of	 Election	 Day,	 Twitter	 placed	 a	













experiment	 with	 product	 changes	 to	 slow	 the	 spread	 of	 information	 despite	




















In	 December,	 amidst	 the	 deluge	 of	 misinformation	 coming	 from	
@realdonaldtrump,	 Twitter	 added	 restrictions	 to	 how	 users	 could	
engage	with	 three	of	Trump’s	 flagged	 tweets.	 In	particular,	Twitter	
prevented	 users	 from	 liking,	 retweeting,	 replying,	 and	 copying	 the	
URL.	Additionally,	counts	were	disabled	and	while	quote	tweets	were	




by	 adding	 some	 “friction”	 through	 a	 prompt	 that	 appeared	when	 a	
	
	 66	 Philip	Bump,	Twitter	Keeps	Flagging	Trump	for	Disinformation	Because	Trump	




	 67	 Kim	Lyons,	Twitter	Briefly	 Restricts	 Trump’s	Disputed	Election	Tweets,	 VERGE	
(Dec.	 12,	 2020,	 10:43	 AM	 EST),	
https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/12/22171126/trump-twitter-disputed-
tweets-election-retweets	 [https://perma.cc/GNJ8-GRHM].	 A	 Twitter	 spokesperson	





user	went	 retweet	 a	 tweet.68	 Twitter	 intended	 for	 this	 approach	 to	
slow	down	the	spread	of	misinformation	by	adding	an	extra	step.69	
Then,	on	January	6,	2021,	in	the	immediate	wake	of	the	insurrection	
after	 Trump’s	 tweets	 condoning	 and	 encouraging	 the	 violence	 the	
Capitol,	 Twitter	 responded	 to	 these	 developments	 initially	 by	
imposing	 a	 twelve-hour	 suspension	 on	 President	 Trump	 and	 by	
warning	him	of	a	permanent	ban	in	the	case	of	further	violations.70	On	
January	 8,	 Twitter	 announced	 the	 permanent	 suspension	 of	
@realDonaldTrump	 after	 Trump	 posted	 tweets	 sympathizing	 with	
the	 insurrectionists	 and	 announcing	 that	 he	 would	 not	 attend	 the	
Inauguration	of	President	Biden.71	Twitter	premised	 this	ban	on	 its	
determination	that	Trump’s	tweets	could	reasonably	be	interpreted	
as	 encouraging	 further	 violence	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 Inauguration.	 In	
addition,	 Twitter	 banned	 several	 Trump-affiliated	 accounts	 that	
Twitter	 determined	 were	 contributing	 to	 and	 supporting	 the	














	 72	 See,	 e.g.,	 Jack	 Brewster,	 Lin	 Wood	 —	 Lawyer	 Closely	 Tied	 to	 Trump	 —	
Permanently	Banned	 from	Twitter	After	Claiming	Capitol	Siege	Was	 ‘Staged,’	FORBES	
(Jan.	 7,	 2021,	 1:42	 PM	 EST),	
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackbrewster/2021/01/07/lin-wood-lawyer-
closely-tied-to-trump-permanently-banned-from-twitter-after-claiming-capitol-




2021,	 10:17	 AM	 ET),	 https://www.npr.org/2021/01/26/960679189/my-pillow-ceo-
mike-lindell-permanently-suspended-from-twitter	 [https://perma.cc/WFZ2-4DQ2]	
(permanent	suspension	of	Mike	Lindell,	@realMikeLindell,	on	Jan.	25,	2021	for	repeat	
violations	 of	 Twitter’s	 Civic	 Integrity	 Policy);	 Bill	 Chappell,	Twitter	 Suspends	 Rep.	




In	 the	 days	 following	 the	 January	 6	 insurrection,	 Twitter	









NBC	 NEWS	 (Jan.	 8,	 2021,	 1:28	 PM	 PST),	 https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-
news/twitter-bans-michael-flynn-sidney-powell-qanon-account-purge-n1253550	







for	 violating	 Twitter’s	 Civic	 Integrity	 Policy);	 Sean	 Hollister,	 Twitter	 Is	 Deleting	




























In	 the	 post-insurrection	 period,	 Twitter	 updated	 its	 policies	 to	
target	 more	 deliberately	 those	 spreading	 election	 conspiracy	
theories.	Twitter’s	 January	12,	 2021	 safety	policy	updates	 included	
the	following	measures:	
• Continued/heightened	 monitoring	 and	 reducing	 the	
visibility	of	those	who	have	posted	or	engaged	with	QAnon	
or	other	coordinated	harmful	activity.		
• Limited	engagement	on	 tweets	 that	have	been	 labeled	 for	
violating	Twitter’s	civic	integrity	policy.		
• Prevention	 of	 certain	 content	 from	 trending,	 including	
tweets	 with	 terms	 that	 violate	 Twitter’s	 rules	 regarding	
Coordinated	 Harmful	 Activity,	 Civic	 Integrity,	 Hateful	
Conduct,	Glorification	of	Violence,	Violent	Threats,	and/or	
Sensitive	Media.	75	
Finally,	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 Inauguration	 on	 January	 20,	 2021,	
Twitter	 adopted	 certain	 counterspeech	 measures	 by	 creating	 an	
official	 inauguration	 hub	 populated	 by	 coverage	 from	 reliable	
information	sources.76	
In	 short,	 in	 the	 leadup	 to	 and	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 2020	
presidential	 election,	 Twitter	 adopted	 an	 increasingly	 aggressive	
counterspeech	 policy	 to	 combat	 political	 and	 election-related	












only	 accessible	 through	 third-party	 archives.	 See	 David	 Yanofsky,	Where	 to	 Read	
Donald	Trump’s	Tweets	Now	that	Twitter	Has	Closed	His	Account,	QUARTZ	(Jan.	8,	2021),	
https://qz.com/1955036/where-to-find-trumps-tweets-now-that-hes-banned-
from-twitter/	 [https://perma.cc/UBD4-669K];	 see	also	 Politwoops,	Deleted	Tweets	






removal/censorship	 approach	 only	 when	 it	 determined	 that	 the	
speech	of	 former	President	Trump	(and	that	of	associated	and	like-
minded	speakers)	was	likely	to	cause	imminent	real-world	violence.		
Twitter	 continues	 to	 experiment	 with	 novel	 approaches	 to	
combatting	misleading	 and	 harmful	 speech	 on	 its	 platform.	 In	 late	
January	2021,	Twitter	introduced	“Birdwatch,”	which	it	describes	as	
“a	 community-based	 approach	 to	 misinformation”	 and	 which	
provides	a	new	vehicle	for	facilitating	counterspeech	and	combating	
harmful	 speech	 on	 its	 platform.77	 Birdwatch	 allows	 Twitter	 to	
crowdsource	 the	 problem	 of	 misinformation	 on	 its	 platform	 by	
enabling	 ordinary	 users	 to	 engage	 in	 counterspeech	 in	 the	 form	of	
writing	“notes”	in	response	to	content	a	user	believes	is	misleading.78	
In	 response,	 other	 Twitter	 users	 can	 rate	whether	 such	 a	 “note”	 is	
helpful,	 which	 in	 turn	 factors	 into	 Twitter’s	 determination	 of	 the	
note’s	 level	of	 credibility	and	visibility.79	 Such	notes	will	eventually	
“travel	with”	the	tweets	they	are	commenting	on,	so	that	other	Twitter	
users	can	see	tweets	and	corresponding	notes	side-by-side.80	Twitter	
intends	 for	 this	 crowdsourcing	 effort	 to	 help	 shore	 up	 and	 rebuild	
trust	in	its	platform	—	and	its	platform’s	fact-checking	initiatives	—	
by	 allowing	 users	 themselves	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 the	 fact-checking	
process.81	As	of	this	writing,	the	pilot	version	of	the	program	in	the	
	











	 81	 Kurt	Wagner,	 Inside	Twitter’s	 Plan	 to	Fact-Check	Tweets,	 BLOOMBERG	 (Mar.	 4,	










special	Twitter	Birdwatch	 site	 at	 birdwatch.twitter.com,	not	 on	 the	
main	 Twitter	 site.83	 Twitter	 faces	 a	 number	 of	 challenges	 in	
implementing	 this	 novel	 and	 ambitious	 process	 for	 facilitating	
counterspeech	 on	 its	 platform,	 including	 ensuring	 that	 the	 note-
writers	represent	a	broad	and	diverse	cross-section	of	perspectives	
from	the	Twitter	community	and	that	the	process	is	not	taken	over	by	
coordinated	 manipulation	 attempts	 or	 other	 types	 of	 abuse	 or	
harassment.84		
In	sum,	consistent	with	First	Amendment	values,	Twitter	generally	




—	 and	 such	 counterspeech	 proved	 to	 be	 moderately	 effective	 in	
reducing	 the	 spread	 of	 such	 misinformation.	 Notable	 exceptions	
include	removal	of	tweets	calling	for	violence	or	interference	at	the	
polls,	 and	 manipulated	 media	 impacting	 public	 safety	 or	 likely	 to	









and	 the	 post-election	 announcement	 of	 election	 results.	 Second,	
Facebook	 adopted	 policies	 regarding	 misinformation	 that	 is	
applicable	to	political	and	campaign	related	speech	generally.	
	











policies	 to	 address	 voter	 suppression	 and	 intimidation,	 as	 well	 as	
policies	 regarding	 election	 results	 announcements.85	 Pursuant	 to	
these	 policies,	 Facebook	 removed	 content	 that	 was	 directed	 to	
suppressing	 votes	 or	 intimidating	 voters,	 including	 posts	 that	
contained	any	of	the	following	false	assertions	of	fact	(regardless	of	
their	source):		
• Misrepresentation	 of	 the	 dates,	 locations,	 times	 and	
methods	 for	 voting	 or	 voter	 registration	 (e.g.,	 “Vote	 by	
text!”);	
• Misrepresentation	of	who	can	vote,	qualifications	for	voting,	






In	 addition,	 Facebook	 adopted	 policies	 under	 which	 it	 bans	






responded	 with	 counterspeech/labeling	 to	 eleven	 of	 twenty-two	
posts	President	Trump	made	between	November	3	and	November	6	













accurate	 and	 truthful	 information	 regarding	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	
election.		











general	 on	 its	 platform.90	 Consistent	 with	 its	 general	 approach	 of	
favoring	 counterspeech/labeling	 over	 censorship/removal,	
Facebook’s	 efforts	 to	 combat	misinformation	 have	 trended	 toward	
labeling	 and	 fact-checking,	 rather	 than	 removal.	 The	 company	 has	
adopted	extensive	measures	to	attempt	to	combat	publicly-available	
misinformation	 on	 its	 platform,	 including	 by	 partnering	 with	
independent	 third-party	 fact-checkers	 to	 evaluate	 posts	 and	
providing	counterspeech	in	the	form	of	“Related	Articles”/”Additional	
Reporting	 on	This”	 on	 topics	 similar	 to	 false	 or	misleading	posts.91	




Stopped	 His	 Posts	 from	 Going	 Viral,	 GIZMODO	 (Nov.	 16,	 2020,	 8:24	 PM),	
https://gizmodo.com/facebook-knows-that-labeling-trumps-election-lies-I-
1845693925	[https://perma.cc/JAR8-22S6].	









Misinformation	 on	 Social	 Media	 Online	 Appendix	 4	 (Stanford	 Inst.	 for	 Econ.	 Policy	
Research,	Working	Paper	No.	18-029,	2018),	http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/	





political	 ads,	 but	 are	 not	 applicable	 to	 posts	 that	 are	 considered	
“direct	 speech	 by	 a	 politician.”92	 Thus,	 under	 Facebook’s	 currently	
applicable	fact-checking	policies,	political	speech	and	the	content	of	
political	 ads	 are	 subject	 to	 fact-checking	—	 except	 if	 such	 content	
constitutes	 “direct	 speech	 by	 a	 politician.”93	 This	 exception	 for	




on	 its	 platform,	 I	 first	 examine	 the	 company’s	 generally-applicable	
policy	itself.	
Over	the	past	four	years,	Facebook	has	expanded	the	partnership	it	




Fact-Checking	 Network.96	 In	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 certified	 fact-
checking	 organizations	 with	 whom	 Facebook	 works	 are	 the	
Associated	Press,	factcheck.org,	Lead	Stories,	Check	Your	Fact,	Science	
Feedback,	 and	PolitiFact.97	Facebook	has	 expanded	 its	 general	 fact-
	
	 92	 Program	 Policies,	 FACEBOOK	 BUS.	 HELP	 CTR.,	 https://www.facebook.com/	




Citing	 Inaccuracies,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Oct.	 3,	 2019),	
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/	
business/media/cnn-trump-campaign-ad.html	 [https://perma.cc/2TSS-XXU9];	
Cecilia	 Kang,	Facebook’s	 Hands-Off	 Approach	 to	 Political	 Speech	 Gets	 Impeachment	




	 96	 Id.;	 see	 also	 Verified	 Signatories	 of	 the	 IFCN	 Code	 of	 Principles,	 POYNTER,	
https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories	 (last	 visited	 Sept.	 12,	 2020)	
[https://perma.cc/JL6K-DGJE].	
	 97	 See	 Mike	 Ananny,	Checking	 in	 with	 the	 Facebook	 Fact-Checking	 Partnership,	
COLUM.	 JOURNALISM	 REV.	 (Apr.	 4,	 2018),	 https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/facebook-
fact-checking-partnerships.php	 [https://perma.cc/R5YC-ZVNT];	 see	 also	 Fact-





checking	 initiative	 to	 include	 the	 fact-checking	 of	 all	 public,	
newsworthy	 Facebook	 posts,	 including	 links,	 articles,	 photos,	 and	
videos.98	The	 fact-checking	process	on	Facebook	applies	 to	political	
advertisements	 unless	 those	 advertisements	 (or	 other	 posts)	














182222309230722	 (last	 visited	 July	 19,	 2020)	 [https://perma.cc/LQ5G-W38R]	
(providing	an	overview	of	Facebook’s	fact-checking	program);	How	Are	Independent	
Fact-Checkers	 Selected	 on	 Facebook?,	 FACEBOOK	 HELP	 CTR.,	 https://www.facebook.	
com/help/1599660546745980	 (last	 visited	 Sept.	 29,	 2018)	











	 100	 See	 How	 Do	 I	 Mark	 a	 Facebook	 Post	 as	 False	 News?,	 FACEBOOK	 HELP	 CTR.,	
https://www.facebook.com/help/572838089565953	 (last	 visited	 Sept.	 29,	 2018)	
[https://perma.cc/VSQ3-SRGR].	Alternatively,	a	user	can	click	 “•••”	next	 to	a	post,	
then	click	“Find	Support	or	Report	Post,”	and	then	select	“False	News.”	Id.	
	 101	 See	 Tessa	 Lyons,	Hard	 Questions:	 How	 Is	 Facebook’s	 Fact-Checking	 Program	
Working?,	 FACEBOOK	 NEWSROOM	 (June	 14,	 2018),	
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/06/	
hard-questions-fact-checking/	 [https://perma.cc/SD33-3YWT]	 [hereinafter	




up	 for	review,	a	 fact-checker	has	 the	option	of	providing	one	of	 six	
different	ratings:	false,	altered,	partly	false,	missing	context,	satire,	or	
true.102	If	a	third-party	fact-checker	has	determined	that	a	post	is	false,	
Facebook	 then	 initiates	 several	 steps.	 First,	 Facebook	 deprioritizes	
false	posts	 in	users’	News	Feeds,	 i.e.,	 the	constantly	updating	 list	of	
stories	in	the	middle	of	a	user’s	home	page	(including	status	updates,	
photos,	videos,	links,	app	activity,	and	likes),	such	that	future	views	of	
each	 false	 post	will	 be	 reduced	 by	 an	 average	 of	 eighty	 percent.103	
Second,	Facebook	may	commission	a	fact-checker	to	write	a	“Related	
Article”	 or	 “Additional	 Reporting	 on	 This”	 setting	 forth	 truthful	
information	about	the	subject	of	the	false	post	and	the	reasons	why	
the	 fact-checker	 rated	 the	 post	 as	 false.104	 Such	 content	 is	 then	
displayed	 in	conjunction	with	 the	 false	post	on	 the	same	subject.105	
While	Facebook	formerly	flagged	false	news	sites	with	a	“Disputed”	
flag,	 the	 company	 is	 experimenting	 with	 different	 approaches	 in	
response	to	research	suggesting	that	such	flags	may	actually	entrench	
beliefs	 in	 the	 disputed	 posts.106	 Facebook	 now	 provides	 “Related	
Articles”/”Additional	 Reporting	 on	 This”	 in	 conjunction	 with	 false	




	 102	 Rating	 Options	 for	 Fact-Checkers,	 FACEBOOK	 BUS.	 HELP	 CTR.,	
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/341102040382165	 (last	 visited	 Aug.	
28,	2020)	[https://perma.cc/4ZKY-BVWW].	
	 103	 Lyons,	 Facebook’s	 Fact-Checking,	 supra	 note	 100;	 see	 also	 Tessa	 Lyons,	
Increasing	 Our	 Efforts	 to	 Fight	 False	 News,	 FACEBOOK	 NEWSROOM	 (June	 21,	 2018),	
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/increasing-our-efforts-to-fight-false-
news/	[https://perma.cc/Z9GK-GAJ2].	
	 104	 See	 Tessa	 Lyons,	 Replacing	 Disputed	 Flags	 with	 Related	 Articles,	 FACEBOOK	






too/	 [https://perma.cc/YJ9T-DF64]	 (describing	 steps	 undertaken	 by	 Facebook	 to	
respond	to	fake	video,	including	posting	“Additional	Reporting	on	This,”	with	links	to	
reports	from	fact-checking	organizations);	Lyons,	Disputed	Flags,	supra	note	104;	see	







entrenchment.107	 In	 addition,	 users	who	 attempt	 to	 share	 the	 false	
post	 will	 be	 notified	 that	 the	 post	 has	 been	 disputed	 and	 will	 be	
informed	 of	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 “Related	 Article”/”Additional	
Reporting	on	This,”	as	will	users	who	earlier	shared	the	false	post,108	




shown	 that	 putting	 a	 strong	 image,	 like	 a	 red	 flag,	 next	 to	 an	 article	may	 actually	
entrench	deeply	held	beliefs	 .	.	.	 [but	 that]	Related	Articles,	by	contrast,	are	simply	
designed	to	give	more	context,	which	our	research	has	shown	is	a	more	effective	way	
to	help	people	get	to	the	facts.	.	.	.	[W]e’ve	found	that	when	we	show	Related	Articles	
next	to	a	 false	news	story,	 it	 leads	to	 fewer	shares	than	when	the	Disputed	Flag	 is	
shown”).	
	 108	 See	id.	
	 109	 E.g.,	 Elle	Hunt,	 ‘Disputed	 by	Multiple	 Fact-Checkers’:	 Facebook	 Rolls	 Out	New	











In	 addition,	 as	 Facebook	 explains:	 “When	 fact-checkers	 write	
articles	with	more	information	about	a	story,	you’ll	see	a	notice	where	
you	can	click	to	see	why.”110	Facebook	also	provides	its	users	who	are	
about	 to	share	posts	 that	have	been	debunked	by	a	 fact-checker	by	
alerting	 them	 to	 additional	 reporting.111	 Facebook	 also	 now	 posts	
more	 prominent	 fact-checking	 labels	 as	 interstitials	 warnings	 atop	
	
	 110	 How	 Is	 Facebook	 Addressing	 False	 Information	 Through	 Independent	 Fact-
Checkers?,	 FACEBOOK	 HELP	 CTR.,	






photos	 and	 videos	 on	 Facebook	 (and	 Instagram)	 that	 were	 fact-
checked	as	false.		
Facebook’s	general	false	news	policy,	composed	of	the	fact-checking	
process	 and	 counterspeech	 mechanisms	 described	 above,	 is	 not	
applicable	 to	 “direct	 speech”	 by	 politicians.	 Such	 direct	 speech	 by	
politicians	 is	 not	 run	 through	 Facebook’s	 external	 fact-checking	
process	 nor	 subject	 to	 labeling	 or	 the	 commissioning	 of	
counterspeech	 in	 response.112	 Facebook	 proffers	 the	 following	
justification	for	this	exception	to	its	fact-checking	policy:	
We	rely	on	third-party	fact-checkers	to	help	reduce	the	spread	
of	 false	 news	 and	 other	 types	 of	 viral	 misinformation,	 like	
memes	or	manipulated	photos	and	videos.	We	don’t	believe,	
however,	that	it’s	an	appropriate	role	for	us	to	referee	political	
debates	 and	 prevent	 a	 politician’s	 speech	 from	 reaching	 its	
audience	and	being	subject	to	public	debate	and	scrutiny	.	.	.	.	
This	means	that	we	will	not	send	organic	content	or	ads	from	
politicians	 to	 our	 third-party	 fact-checking	 partners	 for	
review.113		
Posts	 and	 ads	 that	 constitute	 “direct	 speech”	 from	 current	
“politicians”	 at	 any/every	 level	 and	 their	 appointees	 —	 i.e.,	 the	
politician’s	 own	 claim	 or	 statement	 —	 are	 not	 subjected	 to	 fact-
checking	—	 even	 if	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 claim	 has	 been	 debunked	
elsewhere.114	
Facebook’s	 decision	 not	 to	 submit	 direct	 speech	 from	 current	
politicians	to	fact-checking	is	apparently	grounded	in	the	belief	that	
such	political	speech	is	already	subject	to	sufficient	scrutiny	among	
the	 polity	 and	 the	 free	 press	 and	 should	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 further	
scrutiny	by	Facebook’s	fact-checkers.115	Facebook	further	justifies	its	














credible,	 not	 tech	 companies	 .	.	.	.	 That’s	 why	 -	 like	 other	 internet	
platforms	 and	 broadcasters	 -	 we	 don’t	 fact	 check	 ads	 from	
politicians.”116	As	a	result,	political	speech	and	political	ads	made	by	










$1	 billion	 in	 aid	 if	 Ukraine	 pushed	 out	 the	 official	 investigating	 a	
company	 tied	 to	 Hunter	 Biden.119	 The	 Biden	 campaign	 asked	
Facebook	to	take	down	the	ad,	but	Facebook	refused.120	In	justifying	
its	refusal,	Facebook’s	head	of	global	elections	policy	Katie	Harbath	
explained:	 “Our	 approach	 is	 grounded	 in	 Facebook’s	 fundamental	
belief	in	free	expression,	respect	for	the	democratic	process,	and	the	
belief	that,	in	mature	democracies	with	a	free	press,	political	speech	
is	 already	 arguably	 the	 most	 scrutinized	 speech	 there	 is.”121	
Accordingly,	 the	 false	 Trump	 Campaign	 ad	 on	 Biden	 remained	
available	on	Facebook.	
Facebook	 has	 encountered	 strong	 opposition	 to	 its	 policy	
exempting	politicians’	(and	especially	President	Trump’s)	posts	from	
fact-checking	 and	 from	 other	 of	 the	 company’s	 content	 policies	 as	
well,	 including	 those	prohibiting	 threats	 of	 imminent	 violence.	One	





















(May	 29,	 2020,	 12:53	 AM),	 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/	
status/1266231100780744704	[https://perma.cc/9DCM-9F7G].]	
President	 Trump	made	 this	 post	 across	 several	 platforms.	While	
Twitter	appended	a	notice	to	the	President’s	post	explaining	that	the	
post	 violated	 the	 platform’s	 rules	 against	 glorifying	 violence	 and	









	 124	 See	Brian	 Stelter	&	Donie	O’Sullivan,	Trump	Tweets	 Threat	 that	 ‘Looting’	
Will	 Lead	 to	 ‘Shooting.’	Twitter	Put	a	Warning	Label	 on	 It,	 CNN	 (May	29,	2020,	








29,	 2020,	 3:17	 AM),	 https://twitter.com/TwitterComms/status/	
1266267447838949378	[https://perma.cc/6MZD-BYHA].]	
Facebook’s	CEO	Mark	Zuckerberg	explained	that	he	was	personally	
appalled	 by	 the	 President’s	 tweet,	 but	 felt	 that	 Facebook’s	
institutional	 role	 was	 to	 “enable	 as	 much	 expression	 as	 possible	
unless	it	will	cause	imminent	risk	of	specific	harms	or	dangers	spelled	
out	in	[Facebook’s]	clear	policies.”125	Some	of	Facebook’s	employees,	
however,	 voiced	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 company’s	 response.126	





















checking	 and	 other	 content	 regulation	 policies	 also	 drew	 sharp	
criticism	recently.	Civil	rights	and	liberties	leader	Laura	W.	Murphy,	
along	with	a	team	from	civil	rights	law	firm	Relman	Colfax,	conducted	
an	 extensive,	 independent	 two-year	 civil	 rights	 audit	 of	 Facebook’s	
content	regulation	policies	and	their	implementation.129	The	auditors’	
concerns	 were	 magnified	 by	 Facebook’s	 response	 to	 President	
Trump’s	 posts	 regarding	 recent	 civil	 rights	 protests	 and	 mail-in	
ballots	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 pandemic.130	 The	 auditors	 expressed	
strong	criticisms	of	the	company’s	policies	and	exemption	of	Trump’s	
posts	 from	 its	 content	 regulation	 policies	 and	 voiced	 particular	
concern	 about	 the	 ramifications	 of	 this	 exemption	 for	 our	 political	
process:	
[W]e	 have	 grave	 concerns	 that	 the	 combination	 of	
[Facebook’s]	 decision	 to	 exempt	 politicians	 from	 fact-
checking	 and	 the	 precedents	 set	 by	 its	 recent	 decisions	 on	
President	 Trump’s	 posts,	 leaves	 the	 door	 open	 for	 the	
platform	 to	 be	 used	 by	 other	 politicians	 to	 interfere	 with	
voting.	If	politicians	are	free	to	mislead	people	about	official	


























can	 be	 facilitated	 by	 Facebook	 in	 the	United	 States.	We	 are	
concerned	that	politicians,	and	any	other	user	for	that	matter,	
will	 capitalize	 on	 the	 policy	 gaps	 made	 apparent	 by	 the	
president’s	 posts	 and	 target	 particular	 communities	 to	
suppress	 the	 votes	 of	 groups	 based	 on	 their	 race	 or	 other	




now	know.	Calls	 for	violence	near	 the	elections	did	 in	 fact	do	great	
damage	 to	 our	 democracy,	 and	 Facebook	 attempted	 to	 belatedly	






greater	 detail	 below,	 in	 the	 period	 directly	 after	 the	 November	
election,	Facebook	initially	responded	to	Trump’s	false	election	claims	
and	 the	 burgeoning	 “stop	 the	 steal”	movement	 by	 adding	 counter-
information	to	newsfeeds	and	directing	users	to	official	news	sources;	
labeling	 the	 worst	 misinformation	 cases,	 including	 the	 President’s	
false	 claims	 of	 victory,	 and	 banning	 the	 largest	 “stop	 the	 steal”	
Facebook	 group	 and	 related	 hashtags.	 Then,	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 the	
insurrection,	 Facebook	 extended	 its	 temporal	 ban	 on	 political	 ads,	
with	 an	 exception	 for	 the	 Georgia	 Senate	 Runoffs.	 Finally,	 after	
January	 6,	 2021,	 Facebook	 banned	 Trump	 indefinitely,	 announced	
additional	 measures	 to	 identify	 and	 remove	 content	 encouraging	

















Feed	 algorithm	 to	 prioritize	 authoritative	 news	 sources	 like	 NPR,	
CNN,	 and	 The	 New	 York	 Times	 over	 overtly	 partisan	 outlets	 like	
Breitbart	or	Occupy	Democrats	based	on	 “news	ecosystem	quality”	
scores	(“NEQ”).135	In	addition,	forty-eight	hours	after	the	election	and	
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amassed	 320,000	 of	 its	 followers	 within	 twenty-two	 hours	 of	 its	
creation	the	day	after	the	election.138	Groups	like	Women	For	America	
First	(100,000	followers	within	a	few	hours),	run	by	former	Georgia	
congressional	candidate	Amy	Kremer,	urged	users	 to	 join	 the	“Stop	
the	 Steal”	 group.	 A	 common	 goal	 of	 these	 groups	 was	 to	 promote	
protest	 efforts	 in	 swing	 states	 like	 Pennsylvania	 and	 Arizona	 to	
disrupt	 the	 ongoing	 vote-counting.139	 In	 a	 statement,	 Facebook	
spokesperson	 Andy	 Stone	 cited	 the	 organized	 effort	 around	
delegitimizing	the	election	and	calls	for	violence	in	the	group	“during	
this	period	of	heightened	tension”	for	its	decision	to	ban	the	group.	
Additionally,	 Facebook	 stated	 it	would	 suppress	 the	distribution	of	
election-related	 livestreams	 and	 content	 related	 to	 “stop	 the	 steal”	
efforts	—	 including	 through	 banning	 related	 hashtags.140	 However,	
numerous	 Facebook	 events	 for	 “stop	 the	 steal”	 protest	 events	
remained	active	and	several	“stop	the	steal”	videos	had	already	gone	
viral.	Dozens	of	smaller	“stop	the	steal”	groups	began	appearing	after	
the	 “flagship”	 group	 had	 been	 removed.141	 In	 addition,	 posts	
encouraging	 members	 of	 “stop	 the	 steal”	 groups	 to	 visit	
StolenElection.us,	 which	 directed	 users	 to	 join	 a	 mailing	 list,	 had	
already	been	circulated.142	
In	 addition,	 Facebook	 initially	 stopped	 running	 all	 “social	 issue,	
electoral	 or	 political	 ads”	 at	 noon	 on	 Wednesday,	 November	 4,	
	




THE	 STEAL’	 Group	 Trump	 Allies	 Were	 Using	 to	 Organize	 Protests	 Against	 Vote	
Counting,	 WASH.	 POST	 (Nov.	 5,	 2020,	 7:01	 PM),	
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/	
2020/11/05/facebook-trump-protests/	[https://perma.cc/YGN3-LW35].	













about	 Georgia’s	 runoff	 elections”	 starting	 December	 16,	 2020.144	
Advertisers	 directly	 involved	 with	 the	 elections	 (campaigns,	 local	
election	officials,	and	official	political	parties)	were	prioritized	while	
ads	 targeting	 locations	 outside	 of	 Georgia	 and	 debunked	 by	 third-
party	 fact-checkers	 were	 prohibited.	 This	 was	 lifted	 on	 January	 5,	
2021	 after	 the	 elections	 were	 completed.145	 On	 November	 11,	
Facebook	 announced	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 “pause”	 to	 last	 another	


































accounts	 indefinitely,	 for	 a	 minimum	 of	 two	 weeks.149	 Mark	
Zuckerberg	personally	posted	a	statement	on	the	decision	on	his	own	
Facebook	 page.150	 After	 placing	 labels	 on	 the	 posts,	 Facebook	 and	
Instagram	eventually	removed	the	video	of	Mr.	Trump	condoning	the	
violence	and	continuing	to	spread	election	falsities.151	On	January	21,	
2021,	 Facebook	 asked	 the	 recently	 constituted	 Facebook	Oversight	
Board	 to	 rule	 on	 Facebook’s	 decision	 to	 suspend	 Trump	 from	 its	
platform.152	 The	 Oversight	 Board	 held	 in	May	 2021	 that,	 given	 the	
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Oversight	 Board,	 FACEBOOK	 (Jan.	 21,	 2021),	 https://about.fb.com/news/2021/01/	
referring-trump-suspension-to-oversight-board/	[https://perma.cc/CSV8-V72P].	
	 153	 Brian	Fung,	Facebook’s	Oversight	Board	Will	Decide	Whether	Trump	Should	Be	
Banned,	 CNN	 BUS.	 (Jan.	 21,	 2021),	
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/21/tech/facebook-trump-oversight-
board/index.html	[https://perma.cc/8NU4-HNHN];	Oversight	Board	Upholds	Former	
President	 Trump’s	 Suspension,	 Finds	 Facebook	 Failed	 to	 Impose	 Proper	 Penalty,	










• An	 update	 to	 the	 text	 of	 its	 labels	 for	 posts	 containing	
misinformation	 to	 read:	 “Joe	 Biden	 has	 been	 elected	
President	with	results	that	were	certified	by	all	50	states.”		
• A	continuation	of	 its	ban	on	militarized	social	movements	
and	 QAnon	 related	 content	 —	 citing	 its	 removal	 of	 600	
“militarized	social	movements”	from	the	platform.		
• A	continuation	of	pre-existing	emergency	measures	and	the	
implementation	 of	 additional	 ones,	 including	 using	 AI	 to	
demote	content	that	likely	violates	its	policies.155	




insurrection,	 Facebook	 had	 excluded	 politicians’	 speech	 from	 such	
interventions.	 In	 response	 to	 the	events	 surrounding	 the	 January	6	
insurrection,	 Facebook,	 following	 Twitter’s	 lead,	 undertook	
unprecedented	measures	to	ban	President	Trump	from	its	platform	in	
response	 to	 Trump’s	 role	 in	 inciting	 the	 insurrection,	 as	well	 as	 to	
restrict	certain	types	of	similar	harmful	content.	
C.	 Effectiveness	of	Counterspeech	Efforts	
The	 platforms’	 efforts	 to	 engage	 in	 forms	 of	 counterspeech	 to	
combat	 misinformation	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 moderately	 effective.	
According	 to	 one	 recent	 study,	 social	media	 users	were	 about	 fifty	
percent	less	likely	to	share	false	stories	if	the	stories	had	been	labeled	
as	 false.	 When	 no	 labels	 were	 used	 at	 all,	 participants	 considered	









accuracy	 in	 social	 media	 users’	 beliefs.	 Researchers	 found,	 in	 an	
exhaustive	series	of	surveys	across	more	than	10,000	participants	on	
a	wide	range	of	topics,	that	sixty	percent	of	respondents	gave	accurate	
answers	when	presented	with	 counterspeech	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 fact-
check/correction,	while	only	 thirty-two	percent	expressed	accurate	
beliefs	 when	 they	 were	 not	 presented	 with	 such	 a	 fact-
check/correction.157	 In	 addition,	 Hunt	 Allcott	 and	 his	 co-authors	
report	 in	 their	 article	 Trends	 in	 the	 Diffusion	 of	 Misinformation	 on	
Social	Media,	based	on	their	study	of	“trends	in	the	diffusion	of	content	
from	 570	 fake	 news	 websites	 and	 10,240	 fake	 news	 stories	 on	
Facebook	and	Twitter	between	 January	2015	and	 July	2018,”	while	
“[u]ser	 interactions	 with	 false	 content	 rose	 steadily	 on	.	.	.	
Facebook	.	.	.	through	the	end	of	2016,”	since	then,	“interactions	with	
false	content	have	fallen	sharply.”158	The	authors	of	the	study	find	that	
user	 interaction	with	 known	 false	 news	 sites	 has	 declined	 by	 fifty	
percent	 since	 the	 2016	 election.159	 Based	 on	 these	 findings,	 the	
authors	 conclude	 that	 “efforts	 by	 Facebook	 following	 the	 2016	
election	to	limit	the	diffusion	of	misinformation	[namely,	the	‘suite	of	




(Mar.	 2,	 2020),	 http://news.mit.edu/2020/warning-labels-fake-news-
trustworthy-0303	[https://perma.cc/2T78-257E].	
	 157	 Lee	Drutman,	Fact-Checking	Misinformation	Can	Work.	But	It	Might	Not	Be	Enough.,	
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT	 (June	 3,	 2020,	 1:01	 PM),	 https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-
twitters-fact-check-of-trump-might-not-be-enough-to-combat-misinformation/	
[https://perma.cc/	
R6KA-BZGM].	 The	 political	 scientists	 conducting	 the	 surveys,	 Ethan	 Porter	 and	
Thomas	J.	Wood,	found	that	the	most	effective	fact-checks	shared	four	characteristics:	
they	were	from	a	highly	credible	source,	they	offered	a	new	frame	for	the	issue	rather	
than	 merely	 calling	 the	 misinformation	 “wrong,”	 they	 didn’t	 directly	 challenge	 a	
worldview	or	identity,	and	they	happened	before	a	false	narrative	could	gain	traction.	
Id.	
	 158	 Hunt	 Allcott,	 Matthew	 Gentzkow	 &	 Chuan	 Yu,	 Trends	 in	 the	 Diffusion	 of	
Misinformation	on	Social	Media	1	(Stanford	Inst.	for	Econ.	Policy	Research,	Working	












marketplace	 of	 ideas	 is	 the	 facilitation	 of	 filter	 bubbles,	 in	 which	
members	of	the	public	are	able	to	insulate	themselves	from	diverse	
and	 antagonistic	 viewpoints	 and	 from	effective	 counterspeech.	The	
fractionation	and	self-isolation	of	members	of	the	citizenry	pose	grave	
problems	 for	 our	 information	 ecosystem	 and	 for	 our	 democracy,	






social	 data	 about	 individuals’	 online	 behavior	 and	preferences	 that	
has	 been	 collected	 by	 social	 media	 platforms.162	 Microtargeting	 of	
advertisements	 in	 general	 stands	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	
broadcasting	 of	 ads	 in	 legacy	 media	 like	 major	 metropolitan	
newspapers,	radio	and	television,	through	which	advertisers	provide	
content	 to	 a	 broad	 audience	 (e.g.,	 to	 all	 readers	 of	The	Washington	
Post).	In	contrast,	microtargeting	on	social	media	delivers	ad	content	
to	 very	 specific	 subgroups	 (e.g.,	 readers	who	 shop	 at	Whole	 Foods	
who	are	between	the	ages	of	twenty-five	and	forty-nine,	and	who	have	

















to	 more	 accurately	 and	 narrowly	 target	 advertising	 to	 them.164	
Facebook,	for	example,	reportedly	tracks	a	list	of	over	1,100	attributes	









Washington	 Nationals.”166	While	 businesses	 derive	 certain	 benefits	
from	 the	 microtargeting	 of	 ads	 in	 nonpolitical	 contexts,	
microtargeting	 of	 ads	 in	 the	 political	 context	 can	 pose	 serious	
problems	for	the	democratic	process	and	for	the	marketplace	of	ideas	
model	 that	 underlies	 our	 First	 Amendment	 model	 of	 freedom	 of	
speech.167	Unlike	political	advertising	on	mass	media	 like	broadcast	
television	or	radio	—	in	which	 large	national	or	regional	audiences	







	 165	 Till	 Speicher,	 Muhammad	 Ali,	 Giridhari	 Venkatadri,	 Filipe	 Nunes	 Ribeiro,	
George	 Arvanitakis,	 Fabrício	 Benevenuto,	 Krishna	 P.	 Gummadi,	 Patrick	 Loiseau	 &	
Alan	Mislove,	Potential	 for	 Discrimination	 in	 Online	 Targeted	 Advertising,	 81	 PROC.	
MACHINE	LEARNING	RES.	1,	7	(2018)	(“For	each	user	in	the	US,	Facebook	tracks	a	list	of	









	 167	 See	 generally	 Nunziato,	 The	 Marketplace	 of	 Ideas	 Online,	 supra	 note	 5	






As	 described	 by	 Facebook’s	 former	 Chief	 Security	 Officer	 Alex	
Stamos,	 the	chief	benefit	of	political	microtargeting	 is	 that	 it	allows	
political	 advertisers	 to	 deploy	 “messages	 that	 are	 extremely	 finely	








difficult	 for	your	political	opponent	and	 the	print	media	 to	call	you	
out.”169	
Microtargeting	 of	 political	 ads	 also	 exacerbates	 problems	 of	
balkanization,	in	which	the	messages	that	individuals	receive	are	so	
disparate	 as	 to	 dissolve	 the	 larger	 communities	 of	 interest	 that	
otherwise	ostensibly	bind	the	country	as	a	nation.170	A	recent	study	in	
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research-shows/	 [https://perma.cc/6HHE-RXDU]	 (explaining	 that	 serving	 “users	
with	 information	 that	 aligns	with	 their	 existing	worldview	 .	.	.	 ‘fragments	 political	
discourse’”).	









If	 the	 requestor	were	 identified	as	Facebook,	 it	would	be	served	“a	
copy	 of	 the	 HTML	 from	 the	 official	 Trump	 campaign	 website,	 the	
official	 Sanders	 campaign	website,	 or	 a	 generic	 voting	 information	





those	 it	 predicts	 will	 identify	 with	 its	 message.177	 The	 authors	




the	 actual	 delivery	 of	 the	 ad	 further	 discriminates	 among	 possible	
recipients.179	The	selection	is	“rooted	in	the	desire	to	show	relevant	
ads	 to	 users”	 and,	 the	 study	 notes,	 “can	 lead	 to	 dramatic	 skew	 in	
delivery	along	gender	and	racial	lines,	even	when	the	advertiser	aims	
to	reach	gender	and	race-balanced	audiences.”180		
The	 Internet	 Research	Agency	—	 the	 notorious	 agent	 of	 Russian	
disinformation	during	the	2016	election	cycle	—	was	able	to	spend	
pennies	 on	 the	 dollar	 (or	 ruble)	 compared	 to	 U.S.	 presidential	
campaigns	 by	 deploying	 powerful	 microtargeted	 political	 ads	 on	
social	media.	With	its	use	of	microtargeted	political	ads,	the	Agency	
















able	 to	 sow	 tremendous	 discord	 by	 spending	 only	 $46,000.182	 This	
miniscule	amount	of	spending	took	advantage	of	the	powerful	ability	
to	target	custom	audiences	by	 inferring	 interests	 from	social	media	
users’	 social	 data.	 The	 Internet	 Research	 Agency	 used	 the	
microtargeting	tools	developed	by	leading	technology	companies	—	
including	 Facebook’s	 advertising	 customization	 tools	 —	 to	 target	
specific	 audiences	 that	 they	 believed	 would	 be	 particularly	
susceptible	 to	 false	 and	misleading	 election-related	 information.	 In	
particular,	Russian	operatives	used	Facebook’s	Custom	Audiences183	
tool	to	display	specific	ads	and	messages	to	voters	who	had	visited	the	
operatives’	 fake	 social	media	 sites	—	 and	 used	 this	microtargeting	
technique	 to	 sew	division	 among	voters	—	specifically	 to	 suppress	
Black	 voter	 turnout.184	 Facebook’s	 Custom	 Audiences	 tool	 allows	
advertisers,	 including,	 in	 this	 case,	 the	Russian	operatives,	 to	 input	
into	 Facebook’s	 system	 a	 specific	 list	 of	 users	 they	wish	 to	 target.	
While	 such	 technological	 tools	 have	 long	 been	 used	 by	 corporate	
America	 to	 deliver	 advertising	 to	 target	 audiences,	 Facebook	 and	
other	social	media	platforms	were	taken	by	surprise	by	the	use	of	such	
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tools	 for	 purposes	 of	 interference	 in	 the	 U.S.	 elections.	 As	 The	
Washington	Post	explains:	Russian	operatives’	microtargeted	political	
ads	







weapon	 without	 a	 bullet	 in	 the	 chamber.	.	.	.	 Investigators	





interests.	As	Clinton	Watts,	 a	 fellow	at	 the	Foreign	Policy	Research	
Institute,	explains,	“This	means	that	any	American	who	knowingly	or	
unknowingly	clicked	on	a	Russian	news	site	may	have	been	targeted	
through	 Facebook’s	 advertising	 systems	 to	 become	 an	 agent	 of	
influence	—	 a	 potentially	 sympathetic	 American	who	 could	 spread	
Russian	propaganda	with	other	Americans.”186	Accordingly,	“[e]very	
successful	click	[provides	the	Russian	operatives	with]	more	data	that	
they	 can	 use	 to	 retarget.	.	.	.	 [thereby	 speeding	 up]	 the	 influence	
dramatically.”187	 Targeted	 Facebook	 users	 were	 then	 shown	 ads	
featuring	divisive	topics	that	the	Russians	wanted	to	promote	in	their	

























demographics/ethnic	 affinity	 (e.g.,	 African	 American),	 issue	
interests	 (e.g.,	 “Malcolm	X”	or	 the	 “Civil	Rights	Movement”),	
and	 Facebook	 engagement	 (e.g.,	 liked	 a	 particular	 post).	.	.	.	
Facebook	develops	these	profiles	by	collecting	vast	amounts	
of	data	on	its	two	billion	users	—	including	zip	codes,	posts,	
comments,	 likes,	 clicks,	 and	 other	 information	 —	 and	 by	
utilizing	 predictive	 modeling	 techniques	 to	 make	
inferences.189	
In	 short,	 using	 Facebook’s	 powerful	 microtargeting	 tools,	 Russian	
operatives	 were	 able	 to	 target	 African-American	 members	 of	 our	
electorate,	sow	division,	and	—	among	other	problems	—	suppress	
the	Black	vote.		
The	 Internet	 Research	 Agency	 was	 not	 alone	 in	 its	 masterful	
deployment	 of	microtargeted	 political	 ads	 in	 the	 2016	 presidential	
election.	 The	 Trump	 Campaign,	 for	 example,	 also	 targeted	 Black	
Americans	 in	 specific	 neighborhoods	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 decrease	 voter	
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microtargeting	 indeed	 had	 a	 significant	 effect	 “in	 persuading	
undecided	voters	to	support	Mr.	Trump,	and	in	persuading	Republic	





of	 political	 ads	 via	 traditional	 media	 outlets,	 is	 problematic	 for	 a	
number	of	reasons	from	the	perspective	of	First	Amendment	values,	




exposure	and	broad	public	 scrutiny	—	which	are	necessary	 for	 the	
truth-facilitating	features	of	the	marketplace	of	ideas	mechanisms	to	





social	 media	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 susceptible	 to	 the	 spread	 of	
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2016	US	Presidential	Election,	PHYS.ORG	(Oct.	25,	2018),	https://phys.org/news/2018-
10-facebook-ads-shown-highly-effective.html	[https://perma.cc/54S3-XQPE].	
	 194	 Federica	 Liberini,	 Michela	 Redoano,	 Antonio	 Russo,	 Angel	 Cuevas	 &	 Ruben	
Cuevas,	Politics	in	the	Facebook	Era:	Evidence	from	the	2016	US	Presidential	Elections	
5	(Ctr.	for	Competitive	Advantage	in	the	Glob.	Econ.,	Working	Paper	No.	389,	2018).	







This	 results	 in	 free	 content	 consumption	 for	 the	 political	





is	 not	 subject	 to	 meaningful	 widespread	 public	 scrutiny	 —	 and	









prohibit	 the	microtargeting	 of	 political	 ads	 on	 its	 platform,	 despite	
many	 calls	 for	 it	 to	 do	 so,	 including	 by	 the	 chair	 of	 the	 Federal	
Elections	 Commission.198	 The	 company’s	 continued	 allowance	 of	
microtargeting	 of	 political	 ads	 on	 its	 platform	 has	 posed	 grave	
problems	 for	 the	 marketplace	 of	 ideas	 and	 the	 counterspeech	
	
	 196	 Ghosh,	supra	note	163.	







three	million	people	more	 than	4.5	million	 times.	They	observed	 that	 “[f]alsehood	
diffused	significantly	farther,	faster,	deeper,	and	more	broadly	than	the	truth	in	all	
categories	of	information,	and	the	effects	were	more	pronounced	for	false	political	









mechanism.	 Although	 Facebook	 in	 late	 2019	 was	 reportedly	
considering	 increasing	 the	minimum	number	of	people	who	can	be	
targeted	in	political	ads	on	its	platform	from	100	to	a	few	thousand,	




can	 (theoretically)	 be	 analyzed	 and	 scrutinized.200	 Facebook	 also	
recently	 implemented	 a	 Political	 Advertising	 Policy	 that	 mandates	
labeling,	disclosure,	and	transparency	requirements	on	political	ads.	
Under	 this	 Policy,	 every	 election-related	 and	 issue	 advertisement	
made	 available	 on	 Facebook	 to	 users	 in	 the	United	 States	must	 be	
clearly	 labeled	 as	 a	 “Political	 Ad”	 and	 include	 a	 “Paid	 for	 by”	
disclosure,	with	the	name	of	the	individual	or	organization	who	paid	
for	 the	 advertisement	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 advertisement.201	 Second,	
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see	 fewer	 political	 ads.	 Emily	 Birnbaum,	Facebook	Will	 Still	 Allow	Misinformation,	










NEWSROOM	 (Apr.	 6,	 2018),	 https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/transparent-
ads-and-pages/	 [https://perma.cc/EJQ8-9MXK].	 In	 addition,	 under	 the	 Policy,	
Facebook	 prohibits	 foreign	 entities	 from	 purchasing	 political	 ads	 directed	 at	 U.S.	
audiences.	 See	 Get	 Authorized	 to	 Run	 Ads	 About	 Social	 Issues,	 Elections	 or	 Politics,	







as	 part	 of	 its	 Ad	 Library.	 The	 Facebook	 Ad	 Library	 provides	
information	regarding	 the	budget	associated	with	each	ad	and	how	
many	people	saw	it,	including	their	age,	location,	and	gender,202	as	can	










(May	 24,	 2018),	 https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-political-
content/	[https://perma.cc/EG78-WND2];	see	also	MURPHY	ET	AL.,	supra	note	129,	at	













the	platform,	 the	 company’s	decision	not	 to	 subject	 such	 speech	 to	
external	 fact-checking	and	 its	decision	 to	exempt	such	speech	 from	







did,	 however,	 impose	 a	 blackout	 period	 prohibiting	 new	
advertisements	about	social	issues,	elections,	and	politics	in	the	week	
leading	up	to	the	2020	presidential	election203	—	and	continued	this	
blackout	 period	 indefinitely	 after	 the	 election	 in	 light	 of	 President	
Trump’s	refusal	 to	concede.	Apparently,	Facebook	did	so	because	 it	
was	 concerned	 that	 the	 corrective	 of	 counterspeech	 would	 be	
ineffective	 within	 this	 crucial	 and	 limited	 time	 period	 to	 impose	
meaningful	 checks	 on	 false	 or	 misleading	 content	 in	 such	
advertisements.204	
C.	 Twitter	
Twitter	 has	 taken	 a	 different	 approach	 to	 the	 issues	 posed	 by	
microtargeting	 of	 political	 ads.	 The	 company	 has	 taken	 the	 most	
aggressive	stance	of	the	three	major	platforms	by	banning	“political	
ads”	altogether.	This	prohibition	applies	only	to	the	paid	promotion	of	
political	 content.	 That	 is,	 a	 politician	 (or	 others)	 may	 still	 tweet	
regarding	 the	 politician’s	 qualifications	 for	 office	 and	 reasons	 to	
support	him	or	her,	but	may	not	make	such	an	appeal	the	subject	of	
paid	 advertising	 on	 Twitter;	 however,	 this	 ban	 does	 not	 affect	













that	 which	 “references	 a	 candidate,	 political	 party,	 elected	 or	
appointed	government	official,	election,	referendum,	ballot	measure,	
legislation,	 regulation,	 directive,	 or	 judicial	 outcome.”207	 Ads	 that	
reference	the	above	—	including	by	“appeals	for	votes,	solicitations	of	
financial	support,	and	advocacy	for	or	against	any	of	the	above-listed	
types	 of	 political	 content”	 —	 are	 prohibited.208	 Twitter	 exempts	
“cause-based”	ads	—	ads	that	“educate,	raise	awareness,	and/or	call	
for	 people	 to	 take	 action	 in	 connection	 with	 civic	 engagement,	









policies/prohibited-content-policies/political-content.html	 (last	 visited	 Mar.	 4,	
2021)	[https://perma.cc/9QK3-E29U].	
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	 208	 PACs,	 SuperPACs,	 candidates,	 political	 parties,	 and	 elected	 or	 appointed	
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also	 Cause-Based	 Advertiser	 Certification,	 TWITTER:	 BUS.,	
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-policies/cause-based-







the	 most	 targeted	 approach	 to	 regulate	 microtargeting	 of	 political	
advertisements.	 In	 November	 2019,	 Google	 amended	 its	 rules	 to	
restrict	microtargeting	so	that	political	advertisers	can	only	target	ads	
based	 on	 three	 characteristics:	 an	 individual’s	 age,	 gender,	 and	
general	location	(defined	by	postal	code).213	Political	advertisers	can	
also	use	contextual	targeting,	which	enables	them	to	serve	users	with	




topics,	 keywords	 against	 sites,	 apps,	 pages,	 and	 videos.215	 All	 other	
types	of	targeting	are	not	allowed	for	use	in	election	ads,	including	the	
use	of	Google’s	powerful	Audience	Targeting	products,	Remarketing,	
Customer	 Match,	 and	 Geographic	 Radius	 Targeting.216	 Google’s	
microtargeting	policy	applies	to	ads	shown	to	users	of	Google’s	search	
engine	and	YouTube,	as	well	as	display	advertisements	sold	by	Google	
that	 appear	 on	 other	 websites.217	 Election	 ads	 will	 no	 longer	 be	
allowed	 to	 target	what	are	 called	 “affinity	audiences”	 that	 look	 like	
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campaigns	can	no	 longer	upload	 their	own	 lists	of	people	 to	whom	
they	wish	 to	 show	 ads.219	 In	 addition,	 Google	will	 prohibit	what	 is	
known	 as	 “remarketing,”	 the	 process	 of	 serving	 ads	 to	 people	who	
have	previously	taken	an	action	like	visiting	a	campaign’s	website.220	
Google’s	 microtargeting	 policy	 prevents	 political	 advertisers	 from	
taking	 advantage	 of	 some	 of	 Google’s	most	 sophisticated	 targeting	
tools,	 upon	which	 it	 has	 built	 its	 dominant	market	 position.221	 The	
most	granular	of	those	targeting	tools	are	custom	audiences	(formerly	
known	as	“custom	affinity”	audiences),	an	offering	that	has	allowed	
advertisers	 to	 create	 tailor-made	 audiences	 by	 targeting	 individual	
interests	 and	 lifestyles	 as	 defined	 by	 keyword	 phrases.222	 Google’s	
sophisticated	targeting	tools	also	have	allowed	advertisers	to	target	
or	 exclude	 according	 to	 demographic	 data	 such	 as	 age,	 gender,	
household	 income,	 homeownership,	 and	 the	 like.223	 General	
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problem	 of	microtargeted	 political	 ads	—	 by	 banning	 political	 ads	
altogether	—	and	while	Facebook	has	not	adopted	any	measures	to	
address	 the	problems	 caused	by	 the	microtargeting	of	political	 ads	
(problems	 that	 are	mostly	 of	 Facebook’s	 own	 creation227),	 Google’s	
approach	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 measured,	 effective,	 and	 appropriately	
targeted	one.	
CONCLUSION	
In	 summary,	 the	 counterspeech	 efforts	 undertaken	 by	 the	major	
social	media	platforms	appear	to	have	been	moderately	effective	 in	
combatting	 falsehoods,	 limiting	 the	 dissemination	 of	 false	 or	
misleading	 content,	 and	 bringing	 about	 the	 truth	 in	 the	 online	
marketplace	 of	 ideas.	 The	 efforts	 undertaken	 by	 the	 major	 social	
media	platforms	to	engage	in	counterspeech	to	combat	political	and	
election-related	misinformation	—	by	 labeling	harmful	content	and	
developing	 and	 referring	 users	 to	 accurate	 information	—	 and	 by	
imposing	some	restrictions	on	 the	microtargeting	of	political	ads	 is	
largely	 consistent	 with	 First	 Amendment	 values	 and	 with	 the	
marketplace	 of	 ideas	 theory	 of	 the	 First	 Amendment,	 according	 to	
which	the	accepted	response	to	bad	speech	is	not	censorship	but	more	
(better)	speech.	In	addition,	the	platforms’	efforts	in	countering	such	
misinformation	 contributes	 toward	 “producing	 an	 informed	 public	
capable	 of	 conducting	 its	 own	 affairs”	 and	 facilitating	 the	
preconditions	 necessary	 for	 citizens	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 task	 of	
	
	 226	 Political	Content	(Google),	supra	note	215.	
	 227	 As	 discussed	 above	 in	 the	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 197–98,	microtargeting	
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democratic	self-government,228	which	are	also	foundational	goals	of	
our	First	Amendment	jurisprudence.	
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